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Abstract. Institutional research is ready to move to the next stage, the stage, as argued by 
this paper, should be characterized with a more comprehensive and integrated social 
sciences approach. The theoretical foundation for such a move exists, as the naturel 
connections between political institutions and economic institutions were well addressed by 
North, Fukuyama, and Acemoglu; the influences of cultural heritage on the institutional 
choices were aldo discussed by North and Huntington. Another shift in institutional 
research proposed by this paper is the change from the general solutions to the specific 
solutions because the institutional characteristics are individualized after considering the 
impacts of culture heritage. Through the data analysis of World Governance Index (WGI) 
and other development indicators this paper presents the connections between political and 
economic institutions and the unique characteristics of political orders and developmental 
paths of a few specific groups of countries. The paper also discusses the influences of 
cultural heritage on the institution’s choice and transformation path. Finally the paper 
proposes an institutional research framework. 
Keywords. Institutional economics, Political economy, Comparative economic system, 
Comparative  political system, World Governance Index (WGI). 
JEL. O43, P26, P51. 
 
1. Introduction 
nstitutional research has achieved outstanding results in the last few decades, 
and with the support of the empirical works such as Acemoglu et al. (2002), 
Acemoglu et al. (2014), Henisz (2000), Rodrik et al. (2002), Tavares & 
Warcziarg (2001), Varsakelis (2006), the conclusion that institutions matter for 
economic and social development has been well accepted among academicians and 
policy makers. However most of these studies, based on samples of up to a hundred 
countries, conclude with the general statements which apply to all countries so that 
the specific characteristics of institutions for different countries have not been 
further explored. Moreover, most of studies focus on the impacts of political and 
economic institutions on GDP per capita and the interconnections between political 
and economic institutions are not sufficiently addressed theoretically or 
empirically. 
This paper contributes to the institutional research literature in two prospects. 
First, this paper suggests a political economy approach to analyses institutions and 
recognizes the different views on the development between the political economy 
approach and the pure economics approach. The coherence between political and 
economic institutions is examined and the paper argues that the development of 
political institutions has its own means. The World Governance Index (WGI), 
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi includes six divisions of 
measurements and has been widely adopted as a proxy of political institutions. In 
this paper, WGI is taken as a performance measurement of political order 
development. Following Fukuyama’s political order theory, WGI is restructured 
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into three parts: The State, Rule of Law, and Accountable Government. The 
characteristics of the political order for the countries grouped by the different 
average income levels are then presented. Second, this paper, by taking an 
individualized analysis approach, discusses the unique institutional features of 
three groups of countries: Total Development Group, CEE group, Fast 
Development Group. Furthermore, the paper explains the role of knowledge and 
cultural heritage in the transformation of institutions. Finally the paper presents a 
purposed instructional research frame.  
WGI covers six dimensions of governance quality: 
 Voice and accountability (VA) – captures perceptions of the extent to 
which the citizens of a country are able to participate in selecting their government, 
in addition to freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of the 
media. 
 Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PV) – captures 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized 
 or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically 
motivated violence and terrorism. 
 Government effectiveness (GE) – captures perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of civil services, and the degree of the government’s 
independence from political pressures and includes the 
 quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 
 Regulatory quality (RQ) – captures perceptions of the government’s ability 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. 
 Rule of law (RL) – captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, with particular attention to the 
quality of contract enforcement and property rights, the quality of the police and 
the courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence. 
 Control of corruption (CC) – captures perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, and the degree to which government functions are controlled 
by state elites and private interests. 
All six indicators are based on a -2.5 to 2.5 scale, in which 2.5 denotes the 
strongest governance and -2.5 denotes the weakest. 
WGI data are available from 1996 to 2013, and thus the other economic and 
social indicators are also selected for this eighteen-year time period. Countries are 
classified by World Bank Income Category. Economic data are from the World 
Bank database; other measurements include the Human Development Index 
published by the United Nations, The Global Innovation Index published by 
Cornell University, and The Global Competition Index published by the World 
Economic Forum. 
This paper includes six sections in total. The next section presents the political 
economy approach of institutional analysis. Section three demonstrates the special 
characteristics of political institutions for four groups of countries. Section four 
discusses the role of knowledge and cultural heritage in the evolution of 
institutions. An institutional research framework is presented in section 5 along 
with the policy implications of this study. Finally, the paper is concluded in section 
six 
 
2. The Political Economy Approach to Institutional Analysis 
The political economy approach takes a different view to development, 
emphasizes the interconnections between economic and political institutions, and 
recognizes the independent purpose behind the development of political 
institutions. Moreover, because political institutions are endogenous, political 
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economy approach pay more attention on the individual characteristics of social 
institutions and its causes and consequences. 
 
2.1. View on development 
Political economy views development in a much broader sense than the purely 
economic does. Sen defines development as the process of expanding real 
freedoms. He believes that the goal and purpose of development is not the simple 
process of wealth accumulation but instead should capture the full development of 
a human being: “Greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves 
and also to influence the world, and these matters are central to the process of 
development... The success of a society is to be evaluated, in this view, primarily 
by the substantive freedoms that the members of that society enjoy” (Sen, 1999). 
Freedom is viewed as both (1) the primary end and (2) the principal means of 
development. Any types of underdevelopment, such as continuous famines, 
malnutrition, insufficient health care, inequality, systematically denied political 
liberty or basic human rights, and disadvantaged people in developed countries are 
all the forms of unfreedom (Sen, 1999). 
Fukuyama also emphasized the idea of total development: “successful 
modernization depends, then, on the parallel development of political institutions 
alongside economic growth, social change, and ideas... Development is not only 
about economics. Political institutions develop, as do social ones. Sometimes 
political and social developments are closely related to economic change, but at 
other times they happen independently.” (Fukuyama, 2012) 
Pure economic approach takes GDP per capita as the measurement of 
development and the weakness of this measurement is that it does not provide any 
information on the cost of the wealth generation and how the wealth is generated 
and distributed. To measure the total development of a society a more 
comprehensive measurement is required. WGI, in this paper, is adopted to measure 
the political development of a society. 
Fig-1 in Appendix shows that a positive relations between the income level and 
WGI is existing for High Income Countries, although a few resources rich 
countries are departure from the trend. The positive relationship between GDP per 
capita and WGI are not so clear in Up-Middle Income Countries and Low-Middle 
Income Countries. For example the WGI score for Mauritius is 0.85, which is 
higher than the WGI scores of many High Income Countries, but the income level 
of Mauritiusis is only around the middle level in the Up-Middle Income Countries. 
Lesotho and Mongolia, the members of Low Middle Income Countries, have the 
similar WGI scores but the income level of Mongolia is four times of Lesotho’s. 
These data indicate that for most High Income Countries the higher income level 
associates higher WGI scores, however, the the institutions quality measured by 
WGI may not be a good explaining for the income levels for the developing 
countries. 
 
2.2. Internal connections between political and economic institutions 
The natural connections between political and economic institutions are well 
addressed in the institutional and political economy theories: “Broadly speaking, 
political rules in place lead to economic rules, though the causality runs both 
ways. That is, property rights and hence individual contracts are specified and 
enforced by political decision-making, but the structure of economic interests will 
also influence the political structure” (North, 1990). 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) presented a model that clearly demonstrates the 
connections between economic and political institutions 
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Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) further classified institutions as inclusive or 
extractive and stated that “Inclusive economic institutions are in turn supported by, 
and support, inclusive political institutions… extractive economic institutions are 
synergistically linked to attractive political institutions.” 
Fig 1 in the Appendix shows that political right and economic right are 
positively related for all income levels. Political Right (PR), represented by VA in 
WGI; and Economic Right (ER), represented by the parts of Fraser’s Economic 
Freedom Index (simple average of Legal System & Property Rights and Freedom 
To Engage In International Trade). 
However, the countries/economies listed in Table 1 show a significant departure 
from the trend, as they have higher ranks in Economic Right but lower ranks in 
Political Right; by contrast, Argentina has much higher Political Right and very 
low Economic Right. According to the political theories of AJR, Fukuyama, and 
Sen, broadly distributed political right is the precondition of broadly distributed 
economic right, but these countries do not satisfy such political logic. This 
abnormal phenomenon indicates that inclusive economic institutions could be 
supplied by exclusive political institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson acknowledged 
this possibility, but they also argued that this type of institutional mismatch would 
not be sustainable (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). However, the reality is that 
Hong Kong and Singapore have maintained half a century of stable economic 
growth with such a mismatch, and China saw a similar result over 30 years. Section 
4 will discuss this phenomenon from a cultural and heritage perspective. These 
special cases further demonstrate that institutional characteristics vary across the 
countries and that general theories may not be applicable for the practices of every 
nations. 
 
Table 1. Higher Economic Right (ER) and lower Political Right (PR) 
Countries Code Income Group ER ER ranks in the Group PR PR ranks in the Group 
Oman OMN High 8.72 4 -1.00 40 
Hong Kong HKG High 8.38 7 0.70 33 
Singapore SGP High 8.31 8 0.06 38 
Kuwait KWT High 7.65 21 -0.65 39 
Jordan  JOD Up-Middle 7.05 3 -0.82 21 
China CHN Up-Middle 6.21 10 -1.58 26 
Note: High Income is a 40-countries group, Upper-Middle Income is a 28-countries group. 
 
2.3. The ends and means of the development of political institutions 
The development of political institutions is not for the narrow purpose of 
delivering economic institutions but has its own means and this is an issue of 
political morality. Both Eastern and Western civilizations have a long history of 
political moral beliefs, these philosophies have guided the political evolution for 
thousands of years. 
In the Aristotelian view, the state is a moral entity: it should aim at securing the 
public preconditions to make possible a “good and decent” life for citizens. Hence, 
justice ought to provide the foundation of any polity. The fundamental value of 
political philosophy is the public interest or the commonweal. The public interest 
would be entirely realized if social organization were such that each individual in a 
society is in a position to realize his specific natural potential, i.e., to live a good 
and decent life (Bortis, 1997). 
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Political systems in Ancient China were fully based on morality, the constraints 
to the ruling power were mostly depended on the moral conducts. "The first 
principle of government, in the view of Confucius, is as the first principle of 
character—sincerity. Therefore, the prime instrument of government is good 
example: the ruler must be an eminence of model behavior, from which, prestige 
imitation, right conduct will pour down upon his people." (Durant, 1993) 
Political moral philosophy continues to play an important role in modern 
political theory. In his very influential work <The Theory of Justices>, Rawls 
points out that “justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems 
of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if 
it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-
arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust” (Rawls, 1971). 
Fukuyama defines the political order in three divisions: 1. The State; 2. The 
Rule of Law; 3. Accountable Government. WGI thus is redefined according to 
Fukuyama’s political order: 
 
WGI Fukuyama’s Political Order 
RL Rule of law 
VA Accountable Government (AccG) 
Average of (PS, GE, REG, CC) State 
 
Fig-3 in the Appendix show the three parts political order are supported each 
other. Rule of the law and democracy support the quality of government; 
democracy and rule of the law also support each other. In High Income Countries 
there are a few countries/economies are out of the trends, include Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Macao, and those resources rich countries. The positive relations are also 
much looser in Up-Middle Income Countries and Low-Middle Income Countries. 
 
3. Characteristics of the Political and Economic Institutions for 
Four Unique Group 
One of the major contributions made by D. North to institutional theory is the 
theory of path dependence in institutional change: “Path dependence is the key to 
an analytical understanding of long-run economic change. Path dependence comes 
from the increasing returns mechanisms that reinforce the direction once on a given 
path. Alterations in the path come from unanticipated consequences of choices, 
external effects, and sometimes forces exogenous to the analytical framework. 
Reversal of paths (from stagnation to growth or vice versa) may come from the 
above described sources of path alteration, but will typically occur through changes 
in the polity” (North, 1990). 
Path dependence theory inspires us to argue that institutional characteristics and 
the evolutionary process would be individualized to each nation as each nation has 
its own past experiences. A general description may cover some common features, 
but the unique characteristics must exist for the unique experiences. This section 
discusses the unique political and economic institutional features of four groups of 
countries. 
 
3.1. The total development group 
Fukuyama uses the term of "getting to Denmark” to refer to the goal of political 
order development. "Denmark" in this context is a mythical place that is known to 
possesses the high quality political and economic institutions: it is stable, 
democratic, peaceful, prosperous, inclusive, and has extremely low levels of 
political corruption (Fukuyama, 2012). 
A group of twenty-one countries meet the attributes of “Denmark”. They are 
ranked in top 30 in a sample of 161 countries for wealth level (GDP per capita), 
institutional quality (WGI), and human development (HDI). Two countries in this 
group are not ranked in the top 30 for innovation, and six countries are not ranked 
in the top 30 for competition (see Appendix Table -1). 
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Eighteen out of twenty-one countries in this group are Western cultural 
background. Many great works describe the evolutionary process of Western 
Europe. In his influential book <The Origin of Political Order> Fukuyama 
describes in details how beliefs in the rule of law and individualism emerged with 
religion origins, and how and why national states were established much later in 
Europe than in China. As Fukuyama points out, “Modern political institutions 
appeared far earlier in history than did the Industrial Revolution and the modern 
capitalist economy… The roots of Western social modernization were thus laid 
several centuries before the rise either of the modern state or the capitalist market 
economy.” Fukuyama further notes that the “early development of law in Europe 
was also very important in establishing limits to state power. The very lateness of 
the European state-building project was the source of the political liberty that 
Europeans would later enjoy” (Fukuyama, 2012). 
The modernization journeys of these countries are unique and to duplicate such 
thousands years of cultural roots is impossible,  then what can the rest of the world 
learn from their successful experience? The three Asian economies in this group 
provide a good example of “catching up”. They do not possess Western cultural 
roots; instead, they are culturally strongly influenced by Confucianism. However, 
the WGI scores of Singapore and Hong Kong are even higher than the WGI score 
of United States. 
Originally, these focus institutions were not fully endogenous in these three 
Asian economies; they were either adopted by the ruling elites or were forced upon 
these countries by foreign nations. However, these institutions could be smoothly 
implemented in part due to the inclusive nature of Confucianism. For thousands of 
years Confucianism has co-existed and mutually enriched with many “foreign” 
philosophies. Moreover, the philosophical concepts of natural law, human dignity, 
and justice equally exist in the traditional Asian values; they are merely 
institutionalized in different formats. Thus, an institutional set that represented by 
WGI has no conceptual conflicts with Asian beliefs and values. 
Nevertheless, the influence of tradition is still visible in the characteristics of 
political order. Singapore and Hong Kong are ranked very high in rule of law and 
government capacity, but are ranked very low in VA. The six divisions of WGI are 
about evenly ranked for Japan. Macao, Korea, and Taiwan are not included in this 
total development group because their WGI ranks are below top 30 and there is no 
economic data in the World Bank database for Taiwan. However, their political 
order has similar characteristics to the above three economies, with the RL and 
government capacity being ranked higher than VA. 
 
Table 2. Rank Scores of GDP per capita and WGI each divisions for East Asian developed 
economies 
Country Code GDP PC WGI VA RL PS GE REG CC 
Macao. SAR, China MAC 4 56 105 49 49 37 21 76 
Singapore SGP 10 11 81 11 6 2 1 4 
Japan JPN 29 23 26 21 60 22 27 32 
Hong Kong SAR, China HKG 30 17 51 18 40 10 2 16 
Korea Rep KOR 32 41 53 37 70 33 36 52 
Taiwan, China TWN - 30 47 28 45 30 28 49 
 
According to the principles of political theory democracy and the rule of law 
provide the necessary constraints on the ruling power. In the cases of Hong Kong 
and Singapore, the excellence of government capacity is mainly supported by one 
source of constraint: the rule of law; and this kind of political order has been 
workable for a considerable period of time. This phenomena will explained from 
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3.2. The CEE countries group 
There are nine CEE countries in this group: Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Poland, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Latvia, Croatia, and Hungary. Eight of these 
nine joined the EU in 2004 (see Appendix Table -2). 
These countries are a good example of development through the change over of 
institutions. Their major institutions change happened during the later 1980s and 
early 1990s; the WGI data indicates that seven out of nine countries have been 
continuing to improve institutional quality during the time frame of this study and 
all of nine countries improved competitive capacity over these eighteen years. The 
GDP per capita growth rate is much higher than the Total Developed Group, but 
the standard deviation (STD) of the growth rate is also higher.  
Kornai (2005) summarizes six characteristics of CEE transformation: 
1. and 2. The changes followed the main direction of the development of 
Western civilization: in the economic sphere, change was in the direction of a 
capitalist economic system, and in the political sphere, change was in the direction 
of democracy. 
3. There was a complete transformation, parallel in all spheres: in the 
economy, in the political structure, in political ideology, in the legal system and in 
the stratification of society. 
4.  The transformation was non-violent. 
5. The process of transformation took place under peaceful circumstances. It 
was not preceded by war. The changes were not forced upon society as a result of 
foreign military occupation. 
6. The transformation took place with incredible speed, within a time frame 
of ten to fifteen years. 
Kornai observed that “the presence of all six characteristics together is unique in 
world history” (Kornai, 2005). Such perfect transformation must occurred with 
unique reasons; section 4 explains this transformation by taking a cultural heritage 
point of view. 
 
3.3. The fast growth group 
This group is composed of countries ranked within the top 20 for GDP per 
capita growth rates; all of them achieved over 5% annual growth for the eighteen-
year period (see Table -3 in Appendix). 
Some countries in this group are High Income Countries, such as Macao, 
Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia; the rest of this group are mainly CIS countries and 
the developing Asian countries/economies. The rapid growth of some countries 
were combined with improvement in the WGI, for example, most CIS countries 
and the Asian countries of Myanmar and Cambodia. However, other countries did 
not see this improvement in WGI during this fast growth period, such as China, 
Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Mongolia. The average GDP per capita growth rate of 
China for this eighteen-year period is 8.78, with a STD of 1.9, and the STDs of the 
growth rate for Lao PDR and Vietnam are even lower than that of China. The WGI 
of China, Vietnam, and Lao PDR were all worsened over the eighteen years. 
 
Table 3. Percentage change in WGI for each division 1996-2013 
Countries Code VA RL PS GE REG CC 
CHINA CHN -21.82 -5.67 -227.91 88.21 -127.10 -41.02 
INDIA IND 2.02 -138.19 -30.15 -132.31 -7.41 -39.09 
LAO PDR LAO -68.33 21.40 -71.72 -12.86 33.10 -90.27 
VIETNAM VNM -24.20 -20.79 -45.36 35.92 -23.82 -23.69 
MONGOLIA MNG -78.91 -875.97 -24.75 -37.51 -52.67 -271.27 
 
How could such low volatility and high-speed growth were achieved over 
eighteen years without upgrading institutions? There should be the institutions not 
captured by WGI that explain this growth. The experiences of these countries also 
demonstrate that the fast economic growth could be achieved without the support 
of high quality political institutions measured by WGI and these supportive 
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institutions could be an individualized package and is derived from the past 
experiences of each nation. 
 
4. The Role of Knowledge and Culture in Institutions 
Transformation 
Kornai (2005) summarizes the different characteristics some major historical 
transformations, three of them are related to this study: 
 
Table 4. Characteristics of transformations - from Kornai (2005) 







From the Middle Ages to 
Modernity, from pre-capitalism 
to capitalism 
1. Mainly towards development of the 
economic system? yes yes yes 
2. Mainly towards development of the 
political system? yes No yes 
3. Parallel in all spheres? yes No Yes (with time lags) 
4. Without violence? yes yes No 
5. Without foreign military 
occupation? yes yes No 
6. Rapid? yes no No (very long period) 
 
These six attributes state the facts, but do not provide the reasons for these 
characteristics. Two more attributes should be added to this list: The Roles of 
Knowledge and Cultural Heritage. These two attributes could be the drivers behind 
the above six facts. 
 
4.1. Accumulated knowledge or borrowed knowledge 
Prior to the period of industrialization, there was no model of modernization for 
Europe. From the Great Charter in the 13th century to mass democracy in the 20th 
century, each step towards broadly distributed political and economic rights was 
driven by the new political and economic forces that were seeking for their interest 
and protecting their rights. The evolution of institutions was the result of a long 
period of political and economic competition between the nations and within the 
nations. The modernization of Europe represented a journey of several hundreds of 
years of experimentation and self-correction. The full set of institutions represented 
by WGI is an accumulation of hundreds of years of institutional reforms. 
Combined with this institutional evolution was the consistent knowledge 
creation. The great achievements of sciences and social science built up the 
foundation for the development of technology and institutions. Without 
Enlightenment and the philosophical works of John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, 
John Mill, etc., it was unlikely that an inclusive political and economic institution 
could have been established. 
Europe’s modernization was not peaceful because the institutions were not pre-
designed; they were the compromise results of all types of competition. Europe’s 
modernization was slow because it was a process of constant exploring and 
learning. 
The institutional changes for CEE and for the developed Asian 
countries/economies, such as Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, are 
instead the examples of adopting existing knowledge. They do not represent 
Hayek’s spontaneous change; rather, they were changes driven by the ruling elite 
or new political forces who accepted Western political ideology and philosophy 
and led institutional change in a top-down format. Therefore, these transformations 
could be completed in a short period of time. 
 
4.2. Heritage values and norms 
The successful and peaceful implementation of a “borrowed” institution 
depends on how coherent the foreign institution is with the prevailing local value 
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norms or the local informal institutions. The transformation process for both 
developed Asian countries/economics and the CEE were smooth and peaceful. 
Although the CEE countries experienced a different political system in the 20th 
century, they still share the deep cultural roots with Europe, such as Christianity 
and German civil law. So “returning to Europe” was not only a process of 
institutional change, but was also a process of “returning home” for the social norm 
and values. This transferring was peaceful because the political ideology and the 
social cultural values were coherent; and this transferring was fast because these 
countries directly adopted already existing knowledge. 
Influenced by the Confucian culture, many Asian countries/economics have a 
similar political culture. First, they have a strong state. Fukuyama gives a very 
detailed explanation on the political system of Ancient China. “Different from 
Europe where individualism and the rule of law emerged much earlier than the 
modern state, China alone created a modern state in the terms defined by Max 
Weber two thousand years ago. That is, China succeeded in developing a 
centralized, uniform system of bureaucratic administration that was capable of 
governing a huge population and territory when compared to Mediterranean 
Europe.” “The Chinese state was centralized, bureaucratic, and enormously 
despotic. In China, the state was consolidated before other social actors could 
institutionalize themselves” (Fukuyama, 2012). 
The second factor to consider for Asian countries/economics political order is 
rule of law. As a philosophical concept and an administrative tool, rule of law has 
been in place for thousands of years. “Law is the authoritative principle of the 
people and is the basis of government; it is what shapes the people. Trying to 
govern while eliminating the law is like a desire not to be hungry while eliminating 
food, or a desire not to be cold while eliminating clothes, or a desire to go east 
while one moves west. It is clear enough that there is no hope of realizing it.” -
Book of Emperor Shang, 商君书, 16th -11th century B.C. (Coase & Wang, 2012). 
Unlike rule of law in Europe, rule of law in Ancient China did not originate 
with religion, but instead grew from the philosophy of natural law. The concepts of 
natural law and the relations between natural law and human law were well 
addressed in the "Spring and Autumn” philosophies, such as the works of Laozi, 
Mengzi, and the Huang Lao Philosophy. 
Regarding an accountable government, Ancient China relied on a moral 
standard rather than on law and democracy. Confucius believed that the country 
should be ruled by the well-educated self-disciplined elites. These elite rulers 
should use their power for the public interest and not for themselves. If they abused 
their power, then the people would have the right to deprive their ruling right. 
Confucius had a full self-enlightenment system to train the ruling elites. “The 
literati gentry class, “士”, had a unique social, political, and cultural status that 
cannot be found in any other historical civilization. This literati class essentially 
ruled China during much of history. The personality they should possess is wealth 
and fame never mean much to him, poverty and obscurity never sway him, and 
imposing forces never awe him” (Coase & Wang, 2012). 
Two clear differences are exiting between Ancient China’s political system and 
the modern Europe political system. First is that the legal system in Ancient China 
was an administrative tool and did not have the political function of constraining 
ruling power. Second is in the relationship between the ruler and the masses. From 
Ancient Greece to Medieval Italy, Europe has had a tradition of self-governed 
cities or communities. In Ancient China the state was established very early so that 
it possessed an almost “holy” meaning in the political order. People in Ancient 
China left public affairs in the hands of “benevolent” rulers rather than managed it 
by themselves. They expected their rulers would carry the public duties for the 
public interests, as they were trained in this way. The ultimate justice is the nature-
law based “Rule of Heaven”, not the rule of crown, so it was rightful for the mass 
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to depose the crown if they found that the ruler abused his duty. However, this type 
of justice was often realized through violence. 
Confucianism dominated Ancient China’s political system for thousands of 
years and influenced many Asian countries as recently as last century when 
Western ideology entered Asia. Since Confucianism left the center stage of the 
Asian political system there was no new philosophies emerged in Asia, and most 
Asian countries had adopted various Western philosophies during the process of 
modernization. With the inclusive nature of their traditional philosophies and the 
similar core values, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan 
successfully and peacefully implemented the “borrowed” institutions as the 
elements of WGI. However, the characteristics of political order in Ancient 
China—a strong state, rule of law, and the weak civil society—are still visible in 
some Asian countries and economies. 
 
5. Academic and Policy Prospects 
The analysis results of above sections clearly indicate that the economic 
institutional and political institutions are closed integrated and both general and 
unique characteristics of institutions are existing because the opportunities of open 
learning and the influence of culture heritage. This paper purpose a framework, as 
Fig5-1, for the future institutional research. 
 
 
Figure 2. Institutional Framework 
 
The three part of “Current Institutions Set” are interconnected and together to 
form a kind of “institutional equilibrium” which should balances the power of all 
economic and political counterparts and should be well fitted with the current 
social norm and value. The future research should provide the guide on what are 
the optimal combination of the economic institutions, political institutions, and 
culture norm for total development; further more, what is the functioning 
mechanism of integration of these three parts. 
This “institutional equilibrium” should be dynamic in nature and it is constantly 
influenced by the external forces. There are four major external change forces: 
Culture Heritage, New Technology, New Knowledge, and New Economic and 
Political forces. 
Culture Heritage should be endogenous for a society, however, there are the 
cases in history that the institutions were changed by re-learning the culture 
heritage, such as Renaissance and Enlightenment period of time. The “Reform and 
Opening” of China since 1980’s is not only an opening to the outside of the world, 
is also the opening to China’s own culture heritage, and this re-learning process 
largely influence the current institutions choices and the current social norm.  
Institutions are about the human cooperation and the change of technology 
greatly changed the way of human cooperation. A good example is the internet 
technology changed face to face cooperation to the online cooperation. Such 
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technology change must combined with the institutions change. The current 
institutions determines how much and how fast of the change of technology and the 
technology change will result the creation of new institutions. 
New knowledge represents the opportunity of learning from others, the learning 
could means of directly adopting other’s institutions, such as the Asia and CEE 
cases mentioned in the last section; the learning could also means the change of the 
value and norm so that lead to the demand for the new institutions. With the more 
broad range of information resources such learning will become fast ever in the 
history and the change of social norm and value are also will be much fast when it 
was assumed before. 
The new economic or political power could be formed under the condition of 
current institutional set or emerged with other external accidental factors. They 
represent the new political an economic counterparts and their demand for the 
political and economic power will break the current  “institutional equilibrium”. 
The policy prospect of this study includes the  modernization is a progress of all 
spheres of a society and each of them are support each other. Partial progress or 
partial reform cannot be sustainable and also hardly be able to achieve its desired 
goals. Considering the differing historical heritage, the optimal institutional set 
could be a specified package rather a general one. The most effective help to those 
who need it is to supply the knowledge and education, as knowledge and education 
are the foundation of the right belief set, and the right belief set is the foundation 
for the right institutional set. 
 
6. Conclusions 
With its remarkable achievements over the last several decades, institutional 
research is ready to move to a new stage, a stage focus on the integrated social 
science and the individualized institutional characteristics of each nation. The 
theoretical foundation for such a move is not new. Political economy theories 
already recognize the interconnections between political and economic institutions. 
Path dependence theory indicates that institutional characteristics should be 
individual rather than general. 
Data analysis demonstrates that both general and specific characteristics of 
economic and political institutions exist for countries at different income levels. 
Institutional change could be a Hayek type “spontaneous” change, such as 
Europe’s transformation process; it could also be implemented by a ruling elite 
with existing knowledge, similar to the case of developed Asian 
countries/economies; or by new political forces, such as the case of CEE and CIS. 
The harmonization of these “borrowed” institutions with local values and norms is 
the critical issue for the success of institutional transfer. 
The successful examples of transformation with “borrowed institutions” are 
CEE and developed Asia. These “borrowed institutions” are the fruit of European 
cultural tradition. For CEE, the institutional transfer was also a process of 
culturally “returning home”. The transformation experience of developed Asian 
countries/economics shows the similarity in the core values of Eastern and Western 
classical philosophies: human dignity, equality, social justice. Therefore, Asian 
countries/economics with a strong Confucian tradition are still be able to 
successfully implement the institutional packages that were created based on a 
belief in rule of law and social justice. 
The purposed institutional framework provide the suggestions for the future 
institutional research. The integrated approach should be adopted and both general 
and specific characteristics should be explored. Considering the influence of 
culture heritage the optimal institutional set could be an individualized one rather a 
general one; considering the growth speed of open learning the differences between 
the individualized optional package could be converged in long run.  
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Appendix 1. Full Development Countries 
Country Name Code GDP WGI HDI Innovation Competition Growth GRSTD 
Luxembourg LUX 1 8 19 9 19 1.95 3.71 
Norway NOR 2 4 1 16 32 1.26 1.72 
Switzerland CHE 6 6 3 1 4 1.13 1.70 
Australia AUS 7 12 2 27 7 1.89 1.14 
Sweden SWE 8 3 14 6 36 1.89 2.70 
Denmark DNK 9 5 4 8 18 0.83 2.16 
Singapore SGP 10 11 11 18 2 3.12 4.76 
United States USA 12 21 8 2 14 1.49 1.75 
Canada CAN 13 9 9 26 6 1.54 1.79 
Ireland IRL 14 19 6 17 5 3.41 4.36 
Netherlands NLD 15 7 5 11 16 1.43 2.24 
Austria AUT 16 10 23 19 35 1.44 1.84 
Finland FIN 17 1 24 5 20 1.89 3.50 
Iceland ISL 19 13 16 46 68 2.16 3.15 
Belgium BEL 20 20 21 14 40 1.24 1.70 
Germany DEU 21 15 6 4 23 1.36 2.33 
France FRA 25 24 22 21 56 1.01 1.59 
New Zealand NZL 26 2 10 15 3 1.52 1.68 
United Kingdom GBR 27 16 14 10 8 1.56 1.95 
Japan JPN 29 23 20 7 29 0.72 2.18 
Hong Kong SAR, 
China 




Appendix 2. CEE Countries 
 Code GDP WGI HDI Innovation Competition Growth GRSTD 
Estonia EST 44 28 30 31 22 5.01 3.5 
Czech Rep. CZE 43 33 28 28 30 2.22 3.51 
Slovenia SVN 35 34 25 75 92 2.33 3.37 
Poland POL 55 37 36 67 46 4.16 3.41 
Lithuania LTU 49 38 37 38 58 5.81 0.96 
Slovak Rep. SVK 45 48 35 89 43 4.01 3.68 
Latvia LVA 51 51 46 81 45 5.68 0.43 
Croatia HRV 58 57 57 124 51 2.71 7.62 




Appendix 3. Fast Growth Countries 
GR Country Name Code Growth GR STD WGI HDI Innovation Competition 
1 Azerbaijan AZE 9.21 8.96 137 78 43  
2 Myanmar MMR 8.83 3.19 164 148 137 117 
3 China CHN 8.78 1.90 123 90 40 98 
4 Georgia GEO 7.37 4.14 78 76 110  
5 Armenia ARM 7.10 6.82 88 85   
6 Belarus BLR 6.53 3.81 145 50   
7 Macao MAC 6.31 9.10 56    
8 Turkmenistan TKM 6.49 6.45 163 109   
9 Iraq IRQ 5.48 17.18 165 121   
10 Kazakhstan KAZ 5.76 3.99 135  69  
11 Lithuania LTU 5.71 5.81 38 37 38 58 
12 Cambodia KHM 5.67 2.97 139 143 101  
13 Latvia LVA 5.56 6.28 51 46 81 45 
14 Albania ALB 5.27 4.98 95 85 115 44 
15 Mongolia MNG 5.42 4.26 82 90 104  
16 Lao PDR LAO 5.28 1.20 143 141 71  
17 Vietnam VNM 5.23 0.89 116 130 95  
18 India IND 5.27 2.25 107 116 48 79 
19 Trinidad and Tobago TTO 4.84 4.82 69 64  62 
20 Estonia EST 4.92 6.49 28 30 31 22 
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